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Animals, Ethics and Geography 
 







You ought to follow the example of shunk-Tokecha (wolf). Even when he is 
surprised and runs for his life, he will pause to take one more look at you 







For many of us the moral status of animals seems abundantly clear. For thousands of years 
most people believed animals to be resources that lay beyond the boundaries of moral 
community. Like the rest of the earth, animals were said to exist solely for the benefit of 
humans. Aristotle put the matter nicely:  
 
Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man -- domestic 
animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate, most of them) for food and other 
accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature does nothing 
purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for the sake of 
man.2  
 
If the moral status of animals is so clear, why am I bothering with this topic? The reason is 
that, like shunk-Tokecha, geographers and other scholars across the academy are taking a 
second (and clear-eyed) look at animals and animal ethics. As a consequence of our inquiries, 
we are remapping the moral landscape of animal-human relations, revealing a diverse world of 
ethically relevant non-human beings. Moral value is the keystone concept for remapping this 
world and locating animals in our moral landscape. My intention in this chapter is to centre 
our attention on the subject of moral value, and present a geographically informed argument 
on the moral status of animals. This avowedly normative project is indispensable, for it holds 
the key to reconfiguring how humans (including geographers) understand and relate to the 
animal world.  
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of “geoethics”, a geographically informed 
theory of moral understanding that positions context at the centre of our moral concerns. 
Geoethics’ contextual emphasis on geographical being and community serves as the starting 
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point for our exploration of moral value. Next, I examine anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric value paradigms (including one I call geocentrism) to explain the case for 
including animals in our moral community. I conclude with a set of principles to help guide 





Ethics and Geography 
Like any complex tradition of scholarship, ethics has a blizzard of concepts -- definitions, 
distinctions, principles, theories, etc. -- and espying order in this haze can be difficult. Yet 
Socrates’ definition provides an excellent place to start. Socrates reminds us that when we 
discuss ethics, “we are discussing no small question, but how we ought to live”.3 In other 
words, ethics concerns how we should live our lives, what ends we should seek, and what 
means we should use in pursuit of our ends. Through moral discourse we develop norms to 
serve as guidelines for evaluating and directing our conduct toward animals and people, nature 
and society. Moral reflection does this by generating justifications for our actions using 
principles about what is good, right, just, or of value. Perhaps most importantly, ethical norms 
not only reflect who we are, but simultaneously condition how we think and act, and thereby 
who we may become.4  
Yet what does it mean to seek justifiable principles for action? Answers to this question 
vary with one’s ethical tradition. My answer is rooted in the hermeneutic tradition of moral 
understanding, where ‘justifiable’ means good and defensible reasons, ‘principles’ are rules-of-
thumb applicable in a wide range of circumstances, and ‘actions’ are statements or behaviours 
that affect the well-being of others. Ethicians are therefore in the business of using principles 
which are reasonable, widely applicable, and practicable to adjudicate (and perhaps solve) 
moral problems.5  
Ethics is sometimes dismissed as an ineffective word-game in the face of unequal power 
relations. Such a dismissal is ill-advised, as ethics is both a critique and source of power. As a 
critique of power, moral norms (however they may be named or generated) are the necessary 
concepts we use to identify and analyze oppressive power relations. Ethics is also the creative 
ground from which we envision a non-exploitative future. The importance of ethics, 
therefore, does not diminish in the face of indifference or malevolence: the harsher the 
circumstances, the more we need recourse to sources of moral critique and renewal. As a 
source of power, ethics constitutes (in part) how we understand (describe, explain, and 
evaluate) whether we are in ‘right relationship’ with the world, that is, whether our individual 
and collective lives are morally worthwhile and defensible. Ethics delivers a power of insight 
that unmasks previously unproblematized power relations. Just as importantly, it deeply affects 
human motivations and actions in light of that insight. People routinely struggle against 
injustice and compassionately help others, often at great personal risk or self-sacrifice. They 
do so not only because their moral outlook helps identify wrong-doing or suffering, but 
because it helps motivate them to act and make ethically directed change a reality . This is why 
ethical debate is so important, contentious, and consequential -- a moral ‘victory’ will influence 
not only our vision but our actions in the world, and this certainly applies to the world of 
animals.6  
Unfortunately, geographers commonly set their moral interests and intentions in the 
background. Perhaps this is because many of us think of ourselves as disinterested physical or 
social scientists seeking universal explanations for spatial phenomena. In a similar vein, we 
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often marginalize the ethical relevance of geography itself, regarding moral inquiry as external 
to the discipline, something best left to philosophy, a stance that does not reflect the character 
of ethics itself, nor the ethical inquires of other disciplines alongside philosophy.7  Both these 
postures contribute to a moral lassitude: we do not ask moral questions of ourselves in an 
ongoing or deep manner, nor do we fully appreciate the sources of moral insight latent in the 
discipline.8  
As importantly, geography is not a value-free or value-neutral inquiry. There is a wide-
ranging consensus that all human understanding is at least value-laden, if not rife with moral 
implications. The moral experience -- a conscientious reflection on the ends and means of life, 
an emotional disposition to nurture, a desire to know what is right or good as opposed to 
expedient or profitable, a sense of injustice over a state-of-affairs -- is ubiquitous to human 
life. Humanity's continual engagement with ethical debate is one of our species' special 
competencies. The reason(s) for this competence are intricate, and whether it is explained by 
an innate sociality or cultural dispositions, the phenomenon is ever-present in human beings.9 
Geographers are like other people is this regard. Whether we know it or not, we bring moral 
presuppositions to our work, and whether we like it or not, our work has moral ramifications. 
Indeed, many of us became geographers because we care about the world and want to make a 
positive difference.  
 
GeoEthics 
What is geoethics, and what does it add to our moral understanding of animals? Geography 
has much to contribute to ethical theory, discourse, and action. The contribution emphasized 
by geoethics is the importance of context. Geoethics develops this insight into a distinct kind 
of contextual ethics, one which generates situated understandings of moral problems. With 
respect to animals, geoethics directs our attention to the shared contexts of all life-forms, 
contexts which inform our moral understanding and relationship to animals.  
Geoethics develops the contextual insight of geography in the following way. 
Geographical knowledge is more often than not appreciative of the natural, social, spatial, and 
temporal circumstances of phenomena. These circumstances are what we call contexts, and 
when taken together, what I call geographic contexts . Geography is a contextualizing tradition of 
scholarship: geographers commonly contextualize cultural and natural phenomena by 
emphasizing the interrelations between sites and situations, humans and nature, values and 
social actions. We indirectly refer to contextuality in many ways -- space, place, location, 
positionality, networks, linkages, scale.  
All human activity, including moral conflict, occur at sites embedded in situations, making 
geographic context a constitutive element of all ethical problems. As the site and situation 
change, so too (to greater or lesser degree) does the moral problem, the interpretations, 
intentions and actions regarding that problem, as well as the intended or unintended 
consequences of those actions. In other words, changes in the geographic context of ethical 
problems can change the problems themselves, as well as our understanding and response to 
those problem. If we wish to find appropriate moral guidance, we must take context into 
account.  
With respect to shared contexts, there is a continuity between humans and animals. From 
distant evolutionary lineages to intimate loving relationships, animals are both “familiar and 
extraordinary”.10 Humans have often articulated a radical separation from other species using 
cultural, linguistic, cognitive, social, technological, and theological criteria (to name a few). 
These differences do exist and we should not make light of them. But the differences remain 
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distinctions, not dichotomies. We are simultaneously part of and distinct from the natural 
world, related to yet different from the other species with whom we inhabit the earth.  
As geographic beings we are necessarily embodied as individuals, and ennatured, that is, situated 
in nature’s rich web of life-forms and life-forming processes. The natural world is a 
precondition for our individual and species existence. What this means for human and non-
human animals alike is that our consciousness manifests differing kinds of cognitive and 
perceptual faculties that are consistent with our particular species’ traits. At one end of the 
spectrum are sophisticated biological ‘machines’, life-forms akin to automatons, such as single-
celled organisms. Their consciousness is nil, but their relation to us is both evolutionary and 
ecological. At the other end are species like ourselves that manifest a high degree of 
consciousness. Humans, for example, excel at cognition, language, social organization, and 
technology. No other species manifests these characteristics so abundantly (for better or 
worse). The power thus enabled over the natural world is astounding. George Perkins Marsh 
was correct when he termed humans “geographic agents” of environmental change.11 Some 
groups of animals -- canines, cetaceans, felines, and primates -- share analogous characteristics, 
the emergent properties of well-developed nervous systems, comparatively large brains, and 
complex social groupings. They have a commensurate (if different) degree of consciousness 
and emotional authenticity that parallels, and in some cases exceeds, our own.12 More striking 
still is the communicative competence manifest by human and some non-human animals. 
Humans are supremely capable of empathizing and communicating with our own kind. Yet 
we are also capable, to varying degrees, of a similar understanding with others of different 
species. This is so because they too, in their own ways, are sentient, sapient, social, and 
communicative, emotional, and social beings.13  
Animals and humans share more than an individualizing embodiment and a 
contextualizing ennaturement. Wild and domestic, in wilderness or the countryside or the city, 
animals and humans share geographic environments -- reciprocally constituting natural, social, and 
artifactual contexts. We humans live amongst a host of other social creatures, from 
companion and work animals, to human adaptable yet wild neighbors like squirrels, skunks, 
raccoons and coyotes, to wild and seldom seen bears, caribou, courgars, pine martins, and 
wolves. This is the geographic community -- multiple and overlapping communities of humans, 
domestic animals, and wild creatures.14  
 
 
Moral Value and Geocentrism 
 
Moral Value 
How scholars conceptualize and identify moral value varies significantly. 15 Some claim it is an 
intuitively known, objective truth. Others believe it reports nothing more than emotional 
states or aggregate social preferences. A more sophisticated and contextual account is 
developed by Holmes Rolston. Without denying the element that feelings and preferences can 
play in moral valuations, Rolston also points out how moral value names distinctive and/or 
intrinsic properties of a being or thing, properties that are necessary for cogent ethical 
thinking. In this view, while humans are “valuers” generating “valuations”, the “value” can be 
a property intrinsic or distinctive to the being or thing itself. A moral value in this sense is 
both objective and subjective. People recognize something in the world external to themselves 
that is critical element for moral understanding, and they call this a ‘moral value’.16  
An example may help to clarify this point. Sapience (self-awareness) is a distinctive and 
intrinsic property of Homo sapiens. It is an emergent property of our physical natures and 
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cultural milieu. This is not to say that it is exclusively or uniquely human, but it is a defining 
feature of our species nonetheless. To reflect on human morality without taking sapience into 
account is impossible. Indeed, it is our sapient nature that is responsible for our species’ 
capacity for ethical thought and conduct. In a similar way, sapience is a defining feature of 
certain families of animals -- primates, canines, felines, and cetaceans (to name a few). While 
their self-awareness differs in degree from that of humans, there is a continuity between 
related kinds of animals and the forms of consciousness they manifest. More importantly, 
while humans may recognize and name this sapience, it exists independent of our recognition 
and naming. It is an objective (non-subjective) feature of some animals themselves. So my 
friend Copper (an exuberant Weaton terrier) is cognizant of his own life-world, irrespective of 
whether I or other humans acknowledge that fact. Reflecting on the moral value and 
considerability of animals, like Copper, without taking their sapience into account, would miss 
a feature as critical to them as it is to ourselves.  
Geographic context is an important, if implicit, element in Rolston’s system of recognizing 
and naming moral value. Rolston implicitly uses the characteristics of geographic context 
when providing case-study vignettes to explore the nuances of a particular moral value. What 
distinctive properties exist, as well as which of these we use to generate moral values, will 
depend on the natural, social, spatial, and temporal circumstances of a particular case. The 
moral values identified by human valuers may therefore differ from place to place, and from 
time to time (even in the same place). Yet values are not simply relative to social norms and 
personal desires. While contextual differences produces a diversity of values, some of these 
values (like sapience) are real properties of the world. In animal ethics, subjectivity (sapience 
and sentience) is often emphasized. We tend to direct our attention (and affections) to 
‘charismatic megafauna’ such as wolves, apes, and elephants, subjective creatures like 
ourselves. And in my experience, it is easier for people to appreciate the moral value of a 
highly subjective creature, than a disembodied social or ecological relationship. Yet subjectivity 
is not the only real property of the world from which we generate a moral value. The mutual 
attachments between people and companion animals, the ability people have to empathize 
with the personal and collective well-being of wild or distant animals, the effects that social 
structures and policies have on animal well-being, and the essential role animals play in the 
integrity of ecological relationships (e.g., reproduction, adaptation, and speciation), are all real 
features of animal-human relations. Social relationships and ecological processes are, 
therefore, generative sources of moral value as well. Alongside the emphasis on subjectivity 
then, our moral values may legitimately emphasis care and integrity. Whether we stress 
subjectivity, care, or integrity in ethical deliberation will depend on the characteristic features 
of the animals themselves, as well as the context in which they exist.  
A common means of identifying the presence of subjective, social, or ecological values is 
through two interrelated distinctions -- intrinsic versus extrinsic value, and direct versus 
indirect duties.17 Intrinsic value refers to a being having moral value in and of itself, while 
extrinsic value (also called instrumental value) refers to the usefulness of a being for someone 
else. Because we regard beings with intrinsic value as ends in themselves, they are owed direct 
duties, meaning we have direct moral responsibilities to these creatures. Beings with extrinsic 
value, however, are not regarded as ends in themselves. They are things, means to another’s 
ends, and we can only have indirect duties to them, meaning ancillary duties that derive from our 
direct duties to others. To claim that animals have intrinsic value, then, is to say that they are 
ends in themselves and humans have direct duties to non-human creatures. Alternatively, to 
claim that animals have only extrinsic value is to say that they are only means to our ends, and 




Moral Community and Boundary Transgressions 
Having distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic, we can now appreciate why the concept 
of moral value is so critically important -- it determines who has intrinsic value, and is the 
direct recipient of moral duty. Beings with intrinsic value are said to be within our ‘moral 
community’. A moral community is composed of all beings having moral standing, where standing 
means that one’s well-being can be considered for moral reasons. Moral value is the criteria 
(often unrecognized) by which we determine who has standing within our moral community. 
Without moral value one is left outside the boundaries of moral community.18 In effect, moral 
value marks a boundary between ethically considerable persons and inconsiderable things. In 
human affairs, these boundaries are most obvious in extreme cases. For example, racism and 
ethnocentrism attaches greater significance to the moral value of some human beings than 
others. Thus Nazi ideology regarded Jews as subhuman and homosexuals as pathologically 
abnormal. Both were consequently placed outside the Nazi’s moral community. The 
consequences of this kind of boundary-marking was tragic -- genocide. This is a pattern of 
boundary marking with which we are all too familiar, from the massacres in Cambodia and 
Rwanda, to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.  
This kind of boundary-marking is also at work with regard to animals. Just as it does for 
people, the placing of animals outside humanity’s moral community justifies the most brutal 
and exploitative of power relations. But unlike humans, animals cannot organize and challenge 
the practice for themselves: they require human interlocutors to speak and act in their 
interests. When we speak out for the moral value of animals, we are engaging in boundary 
transgressions., that is, transgressing the boundaries of our human centred moral community by 
demanding the inclusion of animals.19 Boundary transgressions elicit great alarm amongst 
anthropocentrists, and eventuates several objections. Rooted in claims about theology, agency, 
and species loyalty, each objection tends to be acontextual and categorical, predicating its 
recognition of moral value on one or more human characteristics. Because these criteria are 
self-referential, they have the effect of creating thence reinforcing specious moral boundaries 
between animals and humans.  
One theological objection holds that God made men and women in His (sic) image, gave 
dominion over the earth to human beings, and did not endow animals with a soul. For these 
reasons animals have only extrinsic value. While this represents the oldest and dominant 
tradition of Judeo-Christian argument, theological interpretations of creation have undergone 
a tremendous shift in recent decades. For Judeo-Christian eco-theologians, all of nature is in 
the image of God (with humans representing only one aspect of that image), dominion is not 
to be interpreted as exploitation but as stewardship, and God pronounced the creation and all 
its animals good on each of the six ‘days’ before the creation of humans. For these reasons 
animals have intrinsic value, with or without a soul. Given our distinct species capacities, our 
earthly role is to act as guardians of creation, to protect and restore the earth for the well-
being of ourselves, future generations, animals, and the rest of nature.20  
According to the agency objection, animals lack the sentience to be self-aware political 
subjects, the linguistic skill to understand moral rights and obligations, and the capacity to 
reciprocate a moral regard for human being. They are not, therefore, agents of their own 
moral lives. Because moral agency is the ‘test’ of moral value, only humans are within the 
boundary defining the moral community. Critics of the agency argument challenge its veracity 
and relevancy. First, as we have noted before, many animals are self-aware subjects living 
complex psychological lives. Denying moral value to these creatures, while justifying such for 
ourselves using similar criteria, is contradictory. Second, while animals are generally incapable 
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of linguistic production (chimpanzee and ape exceptions notwithstanding), they are quite 
capable of communicative expression and comprehension, as anyone who has been charged 
by a moose in rut or been comforted by a companion animal in a moment of emotional need 
can tell you. It is certainly true that animals cannot speak to us about their needs or intentions, 
for like human infants, they are not the sort of creatures who are capable of doing so. Yet by 
attending to their communications and behaviours we can interpret their needs, and thus what 
interests they have that require our respect. Third, the ability to reciprocate rights and duties is 
hardly a determinative criterion for human membership in a moral community. Infants, 
persons with severe developmental disabilities, and otherwise unconscious or asleep adults are 
in no position to reciprocate anything. Yet we continue to recognize moral value in them, and 
they retain their standing in our moral community.21  
A non-reductive resolution of this issue is to recognize that animals and humans are 
distinct kinds of moral beings. Animals are moral ‘recipients’, incapable of ethical actions, but 
legitimate recipients of human moral consideration nonetheless. In contrast humans are moral 
‘agents’ -- “the moral primate” in the words of Mary Midgley -- beings capable of moral 
thought and conduct, obligated to consider the consequences of their actions for other moral 
beings, human and non-human alike.22  
The final objection is the assertion that humans have (or should have) a species loyalty 
that overrides all moral relationships to other animals. Species loyalists worry that we lose our 
moral concern for humans when we become concerned about animals. There are powerful 
social and biological reasons why humans do have a partiality for our own kind. Although we 
should not overstate the case, there are human relationships that are impossible, difficult, or 
inappropriate to share with animals. Yet there are interspecies relationships that are as deeply 
(if differently) satisfying, and we should not discount these either. Moreover, there is no 
reason to suppose that a moral regard for animals will diminish our moral regard for people. 
Indeed, the practice of moral concern across a range of beings and issues may strengthen our 
ethical insights and commitments. In addition, moral boundary-marking based on species 
membership is potentially malicious. It replicates, in the worst possible ways, the identity-
based arguments that legitimate prejudice, injustice, violence, and genocide against other 
humans. Indeed, many moralists have noted the continuities that exist between the 
exploitation of the human and animal worlds.23  
 
Value Paradigms 
We are now in a position to specify the value paradigms which structure our individual and 
collective understandings of the moral status of animals. A value paradigm is a conceptual map 
of moral value. Value paradigms are configurations of concepts regarding moral value that are 
used to orient and guide our actions in the social and natural world. They help us navigate 
ethical and social space by locating where we stand in moral relation to others. Most crucially, 
they lay-down the boundaries of intrinsic value, and in so doing, map the extent to which our 
moral community overlaps the geographic community.  
Anthropocentrism claims that moral value is centred in Homo sapiens alone. Humans are the 
centre of all intrinsic value -- we are ends in ourselves, alone within the boundary of moral 
community, and owe consideration only to other human beings. We are, in short, the only 
beings to have moral standing. Non-human animals have only extrinsic value -- they are either 
means to human ends, or instrumentally valuable for the continuation of ecosystemic 
functions. They are not morally considerable as they exist outside the moral community, and 
they can consequently have no moral standing or significance within that community. In 
anthropocentrism, the boundaries of the moral community are a subset of the geographic 
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community. Anthropocentrism has been the dominant value paradigm in western discourse 
on animals and nature. As a taken-for-granted and generally uncontested norm, it is embedded 
in virtually all laws, policies and regulations about animals, society and nature.24  
Despite its dominance in our public discourse, anthropocentrism is not the only value 
paradigm about animals. In opposition to anthropocentrism are multiple value paradigms 
collectively termed non-anthropocentrism. As a whole, non-anthropocentrism claims that moral 
value is not centred on human beings. It extends beyond human beings to include parts or all 
of the natural world, including animals as either individuals, species, or ecosystems. Non-
anthropocentrism does not deny the moral value of human beings, nor does it set the moral 
value of animals above that of humans. Rather it expands the boundary of moral concern to 
include non-human animals.  
Where non-anthropocentric value paradigms do differ is in their scale of analysis. From 
these different scales of analysis come different locations of moral value. Biocentrism 
emphasizes the parts of nature, that is, animals at an individual scale of analysis, and centres 
moral value in individual creatures themselves. Biocentrists see a continuity between humans 
and animals, a continuum of subjectivity that help us recognize the moral value in ourselves as 
akin to that of other animals. Biocentrism is the predominant value paradigm of the traditional 
humane movements, as well as the more radical animal rights movement. Ecocentrism 
emphasizes wholes in nature, that is, collectivities of animals at a systemic scale of analysis 
(e.g., populations, species, ecological communities), and centres moral value in the ecological 
functions of species and ecosystems. Ecocentrists claim that the moral value of these wholes 
outweighs the significance of their constitutive units, that is, individual animals. Ecocentrism 
is a widely-held doctrine in both mainstream environmentalism, as well as the values-oriented 
wing of disciplines like conservation biology.25 In biocentrism and ecocentrism, the boundary 
of intrinsic value overlaps both the moral and geographic communities, but only at a certain 
scale of analysis.  
 
Geocentrism 
I have no argument with anthropocentrism’s strong moral valuation of human beings, and I 
appreciate the equally strong claims of biocentrism and ecocentrism that moral value extends 
beyond the sphere of humans. Yet I am equally uncomfortable with biocentrism and 
ecocentrism’s a priori location of moral value in individual or collective life-forms. Because 
most animal and environmental ethicists are contending with anthropocentrism, the differing 
scales of analysis in biocentrism and ecocentrism remains under-theorized. Unfortunately, this 
under-theorization has led animal ethicists into dead-ends. Tom Regan’s overinterpretation of 
ecocentrism as a form of “environmental fascism” is a case in point. Because Regan is pre-
committed to an “individualistic” (biocentric) scale of analysis, he rejects the efforts of other 
ethicists to think “holistically” (ecocentrically) about species or ecosystems.26 Geographers 
too, have appropriated these paradigms as fixed categories, deploying them in a manner 
insensitive to geographic context.27 This rigid and acontextual approach to the moral value of 
animals is unnecessarily restrictive, and positions us between binary choices -- to value either 
parts or wholes, individuals or species and ecosystems, but not both. This binary logic creates 
a false dichotomy, and constrains our ability to think clearly and creatively.  
As a value paradigm, geocentrism avoids false dichotomies. It emphasizes both the parts and 
wholes of the earth. This includes animals and humans as individuals, species, and ecosystemic 
components of the geosphere. Geocentrism is similar to other forms of non-
anthropocentrism because it does not locate moral value in humans alone. It is dissimilar to 
biocentrism and ecocentrism, however, because it recognizes plural centres of moral value in 
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both parts and wholes. The vast diversity of life creates a multiplicity of diverse life-forms with 
distinct properties. From these we generate moral values, the diversity of which reflects this 
continuum of parts and wholes. To account for the shifting scales and circumstances of moral 
values, we need to contextually adjust our understanding to fit the properties of the being(s) 
and situations we are examining. Recognizing the simultaneous and overlapping importance of 
subjectivity, social relationships, and ecological function in moral understanding, geocentrism 
regards all animals (including humans) as ends in themselves, as well as a means to other ends; 
we are variable mixtures of both intrinsic and extrinsic values. In geocentrism, the maps of the 
moral and geographic communities are isomorphic at whatever scale of analysis we choose.  
 
 
Practicing Solidarity in the Geographic Community 
 
The whales turn and glisten, plunge 
 and sound and rise again, 
Hanging over subtly darkening deeps 
Flowing like breathing planets 
in the sparkling whorls of 
 living light -- 




Gary Snyder is a geographer. Not a professional geographer, but a geographer at heart, a poet 
with a profound sense of place, and an acute understanding of the intricate symbolic, social 
and natural connections between animals, humans, and nature. He has a talent for opening 
our hearts and minds to the wondrous geodiversity of this world. He can also strike a sadder, 
even angry note, unveiling how we live at the expense of ourselves and our neighbors -- wild 
and domestic animals, species and ecosystems, indigenous peoples, the poor, the oppressed 
and the marginalized -- all the ‘others’ with whom we share this planet.  
 
Brazil says “sovereign use of Natural Resources” 
Thirty thousand kinds of unknown plants. 
The living actual people of the jungle 
  sold and tortured 
And a robot in a suit who peddles a delusion called “Brazil” 
  can speak for them? 29 
 
Penned at the United Nations Environment Conference (Stockholm) in 1972, “Mother Earth: 
Her Whales” portrays our home as resplendent -- a wondrous “breathing planet”, a cybernetic 
ecosystem transforming matter and radiant energy into “living light”, a geome (global biome) 
packed with an ever evolving diversity of life-forms and life-ways. Our home is also materially 
and spiritually degraded -- raped of resources, its creatures (human and non-human alike) 
enslaved or exploited for profit, the richness of life “parceled out” like commodities with nary 
a concern for the well-being of ourselves, our neighbors, or future generations. Thus,  
 
The robots argue how to parcel out our Mother Earth 
To last a little longer 
Animal Geographies 
289 
  like vultures flapping 
Belching, gurgling, 
  near a dying Doe.30  
 
Central to Snyder’s writing is a moral valuation of animals and the rest of nature.31 Snyder 
envisions a moral community to which all life belongs, a global geographical community in the 
language of geoethics. This moral valuation of animals and nature destabilizes the routine view 
of animals as resources, as instrumental means to human ends. The whales, for example, are 
not fungible commodities for humans to use at our pleasure, but members of an extended 
moral community. They are morally considerable in and of themselves; they have intrinsic 
value; they are the property of no one -- except the web of life we call Mother Earth.  
For these reasons, Snyder would have us stand in solidarity with each member of the 
geographical community against the forces that ravage and despoil animals, nature and 
ourselves.  
 
Solidarity. The People. 
Standing Tree People! 
Flying Bird People! 
Swimming Sea People! 
Four-legged, two-legged, people!32  
 
Thus for Snyder our solidarity should not be restricted to ourselves, human beings, the ‘two-
legged’. Our solidarity should extend to the standing, flying, swimming, and four-legged 
‘people’, that is, with the geographical community of life in which we are pragmatically and 
morally interlaced. But what does solidarity mean?  
Solidarity is a condition of relative unity binding members of a group into a fellowship of 
rights and responsibilities. Amongst human beings the basis for unity is multi-faceted. It has a 
social edge with respect to material interests or shared identity(ies); a locational edge regarding 
affective ties to place; a political edge with regards to contested and common purposes. There 
is a moral edge as well. Solidarity presupposes a felt recognition that we are part of a moral 
community of beings whose welfare is not only important to our own well-being, but is 
important in its own right, a value for which we are willing to struggle and to sacrifice.  
The question remains, however, whether solidarity is possible between humans and the 
other animals. Because of our distinct capabilities, humans practice solidarity with one another 
through flexible strategies of mutual aid -- fair trade, social networks and alliances, political 
negotiations and protests and direct actions, appeals to good sense, moral arguments, and the 
like. Basic to all these strategies is a context of linguistically constituted personal and social 
interactions. We argue, bargain, promise, scheme, organize, and evaluate our actions. 
Structuralist accounts of social forces notwithstanding, we act with a high degree of 
intentionality. We are after all, Homo sapiens , the wise ones. Yet the gifts of animals are 
different from our own. Animals are not the sort of creatures who can linguistically 
conceptualize and strategize mutual aid. How we may practice solidarity in our relationship to 
them is, therefore, on the face of things, not at all clear. Moreover, acting on behalf of animal 
well-being is obviously a large and complex undertaking. We have individuals and species, 
domestic and wild, microfauna and megafauna, human needs and social justice, as just some 
of the contextual considerations to take into account.  
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A moral principle is a rule-of-thumb used to help guide our thought and conduct in the world. 
Principles are developed from moral concepts into prescriptive or proscriptive statements. 
Thus the moral concept of equality is developed into the principle, “Treat like cases alike; 
different cases differently”. Because they inform our ethical outlooks and deliberations, 
principles are very helpful (if insufficient in themselves) to the task of changing or 
concretizing our moral relations in the world. Good principles are guidelines, not axiomatic 
truths, and have four characteristics that we should keep in mind. First, they should be general, 
that is, applicable in a wide variety of contexts. Second, they should be practicable, by which I 
do not mean narrowly pragmatic or immediately attainable, but possible in the long run for 
agents of average intelligence, good will, and social organization. Third, they should be 
interpretable, as in subject to a legitimate range of interpretation and innovative use. Finally, they 
should be limited, meaning we should be suspicious of simplistic formulas and give due regard 
to a principle’s intended use(s) and limitations.  
Geoethics can help us actualize solidarity by providing principles directed at animal-human 
relations. So I conclude this chapter with four principles -- geocentrism, equal consideration, 
hard cases, and moral carrying capacity. These are not the only principles we might (or should) 
consult, but I offer these as a geographically informed place for geographers to begin their 
moral and policy reflections (Figure 7).33  
1. Principle of Geocentrism -- Recognize the moral value of animals, humans, and the rest of nature. 
This is our “first principle” because it values animals in our moral landscape, encourages 
humans to acknowledge their membership in the geographic community, and implies duties to 
respect and protect the community’s human and non-human members. It also emphasizes the 
importance of considering ‘soft’ (non-tangible) values in the public policy process, and as 
such, helps reveal the implicit value paradigms that pervade such discussions. The words 
‘respect and protect’ are intentionally meant to make this principle a strong regulative ideal, 
that is, we not only have duties to refrain from causing harm (a duty of non-malevolence), but 
duties to act to promote the well-being of the geographic community as a whole (a duty of 
benevolence). This principle does not deny or diminish our parallel concerns for human 
rights, interests, or justice. It does, however, reject the automatic privileging of human over 
animal well-being.  
2. Principle of Equal Consideration -- Give equal consideration to the well-being of all creatures 
affected by our actions.34 This principle’s intent is to help us identify and then balance the well-
being of animals and humans. If we refuse to transgress anthropocentrism’s moral boundary, 
the matter is comparatively simple -- we restrict moral value to human beings, pass humane 
legislation to protect our emotional sensibilities about the treatment of individual animals, and 
conserve the biological resources of species and ecosystems efficiently. The matter becomes 
complex when we recognize animals as members of our moral community, and is much more 
so when we realize there are several scales of analysis and associated varieties of moral value.  
Differences in moral value are important when weighing competing ethical concerns, and 
thus the moral significance we accord a claim is a critical feature of moral deliberation.35 The 
well-being of certain beings can be more significant than that of others, such as when the well-
being of an human being outweighs that of an insect because of the person’s sapience and 
social relationships. But this does not mean that we never face inevitably difficult choices 
about whose well-being to favour. Weighing multiple kinds of moral values (e.g., subjectivity, 
social relationships, ecological relations) is complex and fraught with uncertainty. An example 
is the conundrum of animal experimentation. There are reasonable arguments that justify 
certain experiments as necessary for the benefit of both human and non-human animals. Yet 
there is no justification beyond anthropocentrism to forcibly use apes and chimpanzees in 
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medical experiments we are unwilling to perform upon ourselves.36 In each case, the 
significance of different ethical claims must be weighed carefully.  
Most importantly, this principle does not justify outlandish comparisons. Humans are not 
microbes, sapient creatures are not machines, and species are not individuals. Each of these 
will manifest differing kinds of moral value as we change the scale of our analysis. Nor does it 
require us to treat different animals in exactly the same manner. “‘Equality of consideration’ 
does not imply ‘sameness of treatment’. Where beings differ, then equality of consideration 
will positively require appropriate differences of treatment”.37 A contextual recognition of 
moral value encourages us pay close attention to the characteristics of the being(s) themselves, 
as well as to the circumstances of the moral problem. Finally, what this principle does require 
is for humans to give due consideration to the well-being of other creatures, and to do so 
without prejudice.  
3. Principle of Hard Cases -- When faced with hard cases pitting animals against humans, solve the 
problem, look for alternatives, or choose a geographic compromise that defends the well-being of animals. Cases 
of win/lose conflict are a fact of life, and when these cases involve multiple values, they can 
be hard to judge. This is clear to all of us who value predators as well as prey, and must 
therefore accept (even embrace) the suffering and death that comes with predation. Of course, 
there is no choice in predation, for it is a natural given of the geosphere, an intrinsic property 
necessary to the survival of all geographic beings. So too, all geographic beings require habitat, 
viable populations, food sources, etc. Our universal need for ‘space’ makes conflicts over 
resource use, land-use planning, habitat change or destruction, and destructive or dangerous 
animals, an inevitable feature of our lives. Inevitably, we will face hard cases where the well-
being of humans and animals are in conflict, for geographically, it is impossible to maximize 
the well-being of all members of the geographic community in exactly the same place. These 
conflicts are especially acute at the macro-scale -- between the growing urban and rural 
landscapes of the humanitat, and the shrinking wildlands necessary to sustain large carnivores, 
herds of herbivores, and the full range of biodiversity. Yet they are as troublesome at the 
micro-scale, as when suburban homeowners refuse to share their habitat with adaptable wild 
creatures like raccoons.  
When we face such difficult choices, the principle of hard cases asks that we take the 
following steps. First, we should resolve the underlying conflict in order to eliminate the 
problem and prevent its recurrence in the future. Second, if no resolution to the conflict is 
possible, we should look for the best possible alternative, a course of action that does the least 
harm while optimizing animal and human well-beings. Third, if no clear alternative is available 
(or agreeable), we should seek a geographic compromise that maximizes animal and human 
well-being in different places. One caveat, however, is that the reality of hard cases should not 
be used as a justification for ‘mitigation’ planning, or other subterfuges to acting on behalf of 
animals. In the words of Rolston, while we should emphasize “non-rival values”, we should be 
careful of compromise, especially when the balance of land-use practices and habitat change is 
already skewed against the interests of animals.38  
4. Principle of Moral Carrying Capacity -- Humans should live within a carrying capacity that 
preserves the integrity of the entire geographical community. Viewed historically and geographically, there 
is no ‘essential’ carrying capacity for the earth, meaning we cannot specify a single, quantifiable 
value for the human population. How many people nature can sustain depends on our 
numbers, consumption, negative externalities, social organization and conflict, technology, 
and the like. This is not to imply there are no limits, whether to resource use or population 
growth or environmental degradation, but these limits do co-vary with other factors.39 
Embedded in this discourse of carrying capacity, however, is an anthropocentric bias. We 
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often speak of carrying capacity as if it were solely a matter of matching economic resources 
to human demands, as if the conflict over carrying capacity only pertains to human haves and 
have-nots. So to, we often fail to consider the implications for animal well-being and diversity, 
not to mention aboriginal cultures and their ways-of-life.40  
This is especially important at the global scale; there is nowhere else to go, after all. Yet it 
is as important in certain biogeographical regions and locales, some of which are more 
sensitive to human disruption, others of which harbour animals especially threatened by 
human activities. So the carrying capacity of a locale, a region, or the globe is partially 
constituted by the value we recognize in the various kinds of animals, biomes, and societies 
living or capable of living in these areas. Different forms of human ways-of-life are more (or 
less) compatible with the existence of diverse life-forms and cultures, if only because of 
variable resources and habitat requirements. The use of these resources and habitats 
inextricably affects the well-being of non-human animals, as well as of other (especially 
indigenous) cultures. A comparison of the cultural diversity and biological fecundity of the 
Serengeti plain, with the cultural and biological impoverishment of North America’s prairie, 
drives this point home. When we talk about carrying capacity then, we must justify the burden 
our society places on the natural world, and justify that burden according to ethical principles. 
If we wish to live morally in concert with a diversity of human and non-human animals, we 
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